concept to students of social history. If this is the author's intended audience, the book can be recommended. Students of the history of psychology are already familiar with this material.

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Roger Smith. ***Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature***. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 256 pp. $35.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-231-14166-6.

Given the staking of its disciplinary identity in science throughout the last 150 years, psychology should have a lot to learn from, as well as interest in, the relative newcomer field of history of science. Not least because the disciplinary identity of psychology, like what is exactly meant by "science" as the ideal to which it aspires, have been and continue to be vexed questions. If a phrase like "human science" raises that vexation into prominence, then Roger Smith's *Being Human* is the kind of writing by a historian of science that psychologists should read. Cogent, erudite, carefully reasoned, and clearly written, Smith's book makes the case for history as a non-negligible contributor to the meaning or "nature" of "human being," and as central to all the human sciences. In doing so he is proposing, at the minimum, considerations of history as a corrective to the imbalanced understanding of human nature as basically biological—an imbalanced understanding particularly prominent in psychology. Implied throughout, however, is a stronger thesis: that because biological discourse is itself historically situated and changing, not only our conception of "human nature," but *all* biological (and natural science) conceptions of their subject matter, need to be understood historically (e.g., p. 191; p. 259). In either case, whether interpreted modestly as a corrective or controversially as a radical challenge, the text deserves reading from a broad audience.

The case Smith makes is in most parts philosophical, but not in order to set philosophy against biology. Smith is making the (largely philosophical) case for *history*. From this point of view, philosophical anthropology, as philosophical counter to the biologically-reductive account, proposes a valuation of "human nature" as rational or moral essence that also claims to "escape" history. It opposes biology through an appeal to reflective consciousness that Smith also makes, for crucial to his argument is that human self-understanding and self-knowledge are active in making human nature what it is and becomes. Unlike philosophical anthropology, however, Smith understands the reflectively-sustained circularity between thought and action *as* history, and as itself always relative to a particular historically-developed understanding—not as its ahistorical ground. Biology and philosophical anthropology (and also, ethical or religious idealizations of human nature in terms of free will or some God-given attribute, alternatives which Smith notes but does not pursue in detail) are, then, *rivals* to Smith's historical account.

The argument from history for the distinctiveness of the human sciences is not new; it begins in the sixteenth century with Vico, is given particular prominence and urgency by Dilthey at the end of the nineteenth century, and recurs throughout the vicissitudes of the twentieth century in claims issuing from hermeneutics from figures like Gadamer and critiques from personages

like Foucault. Much of the merit of this book is precisely in how Smith *renews* the argument. He doesn't do so through a detailed recap of the various sciences that have dealt with "human being"—in large part because his *History of the Human Sciences* (1997), a magisterial history from the sixteenth century to the present, does that – but in providing the careful reasoning for how and why that history matters. It gives the theory that was assumed in the earlier work and while the 1997 text was a narrative history far-ranging in its scope and careful (as well as necessarily lengthy) in its enumeration, the 2007 text is much more self-consciously an argument in (shorter) essay form. In doing so Smith provides considerable theoretical and bibliographic substance for arguments against the still too commonplace celebratory histories that assume the present state of the discipline as criterial, substance that also serves as a cogent presentation of much of the reasoning behind emerging critical historical approaches. Three of the chapters—on the rival claims from biology and philosophical anthropology about human nature, on the theme of reflexivity, and on the relations between the natural and the human sciences—cover a broad swath of difficulty theory and sophisticated thought with remarkable facility, laying out the intellectual background wherein critical reflexivity and an increasing appreciation for history has developed its force. Smith continues with a chapter on the precedents for the human sciences, claiming that while previous "arguments do not constitute a tradition properly so-called, since they are not connected by continuous institutional or cultural links," their importance for establishing precedent for the viability of the human sciences resides in their continuity "from Vico to Gadamer" (p. 172). Thus by his final chapters that thematize history as significant knowledge in its own right, and the relationship between values and knowledge, Smith has provided both a "critical mass" of theoretical work as well as a demonstrated continuity for such work to back up his claims.

The text provides a rare working example of a mobilizing of tradition that is on the one hand self-conscious enough to be theoretically transparent rather than take that tradition for granted, while on the other hand it, in a sense, "creates" that very tradition through the self-same movement that "mobilizes" it. The significance of this as an achievement shouldn't be underestimated, not least because it contrasts starkly with the dominant model of empirical argument embodied in the natural sciences, in which technologies, methodology, and laboratory practice come together to mobilize their traditions in some way—a way that is still not very well understood. To what extent that way of mobilizing tradition is responsible for the current form of specialized disciplinary knowledge remains an open question—and as evident from the wealth of material from numerous fields that Smith brings to bear over the course of the book, a highly contentious issue. Much of the fighting of the recent "science wars," the ongoing controversy stirred up by science and technology studies, and a profound unease and unresolved ambivalence around "science" that debates about relativism or realism only serve to conceal, likely ride on the issue. *Being Human* sheds significant light on what is involved, and holds out some promise for the possibility of engaging in stimulating and intellectually responsible discussion that transcends disciplinary boundaries.

This last ambition—of an open-ended study that moves beyond given disciplinary boundaries and aims for integration of different forms of knowledge—is key for the whole work: Smith acknowledges that he is arguing on a very broad front, but also that "broad perspectives have their own discipline" (p. vi). The argument is philosophical, not in a professional sense, but "the kind any person can and must engage in if they wish to reflect on science" (p. 12). It is historical, which Smith claims "is not at root academic, but academic work disciplines a fundamental dimension of human life" (p. 181). And the focus is on the human sciences, because the latter phrase "does not describe a discipline but creates social space where disciplines seek to co-operate" (p. 213). It is this reviewer's sense that Smith achieves to a significant extent these

admirable and ambitious aims; but to really decide this you must read the book and judge for yourself.

Reference

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Craig E. Stephenson, *Possession: Jung's Comparative Anatomy of the Psyche*. London & New York: Routledge, 2009. 200 pp. $90.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-415-44651-8. $34.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-415-44652-5.

"What possessed me to say that?" This question is obvious enough to anyone who hears it and a puzzle of self-knowledge to one who says it. For Stephenson, possession is "a linchpin of Jung's analytical psychology" (p. 1), and he examines possession historically, anthropologically, psychiatrically, theoretically, and theatrically, to render the term in Jungian thought more precise. The book reframes the associations of Jung with the esoteric and the occult as his "rhetorical privileging of poetic logic and of paradox" (p. 109). This book belongs with others that emphasize roots of Jung's psychology in the French dissociationist psychology of Charcot, Janet, and Binet, as described by Ellenberger (1970) and Charet (1993), who stressed Jung's indebtedness to spiritualism. Jung's place in scientific psychology has been marginal despite his claims of being empirical; this book strengthens the view that Jung's psychology deserves a solid place in the human science tradition in psychology.

The book's intent is to "anatomize" possession in Jung's psychology and to "analogize" it by finding correspondences to it in other fields. Readers of this journal will find the second chapter especially interesting, as it addresses possession in historical context, examining the continuing and conflicting interpretations of a case of demonic possession among Ursuline nuns in the 1630s at Loudun, near the towns of Richelieu and Descartes (formerly La Haye, Descartes' birthplace), a symbolism Stephenson exploits admirably. The initial investigation led to the execution of a local priest as a sorcerer. Even at the time, there were both religious (Catholic vs. Huguenot) and medical disagreements over the incident. Stephenson's hero was a Catholic priest, Jean-Joseph Surin, who instead of exorcising the demons from the prioress, Jeanne de Anges, prayed "for her devils to possess him instead, in order to take the suffering of his charge upon himself" (p. 26). Surin as "a kind of wounded healer" (p. 27) represents an approach to possession that does not seek automatically to expel whatever is at the heart of this intense suffering.

The following chapter develops the distinction made by Claude Lévi-Strauss between two ways cultures deal with possessions, however understood: by incorporating or by expelling the "Other" (p. 65). Surin incorporated, whereas the exorcists expelled. Anthropological investigations reveal a variety of Surin-like examples, including the marrying of a spirit. Stephenson draws on Jung's diagnosis of Western consciousness as dissociated to conclude this chapter